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Governance indicators are now widely used as tools for 
conducting development dialogue, allocating external 
assistance, and influencing foreign direct investment. This 
paper argues that available governance indicators are not 
suitable for these purposes as they do not conceptualize 
governance and fail to capture how citizens perceive the 
governance environment and outcomes in their countries. 
The paper attempts to fill this void by conceptualizing 
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governance and implementing a uniform and consistent 
framework for measuring governance quality across 
countries and over time based on citizens' evaluations. 
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Since the publication of pioneering work on measuring governance quality by Huther
and Shah (1998), there has been a proliferation of composite worldwide governance
indicators purporting to measure various aspects of governance quality (see Arndt,
2008, for the history and politics of governance ratings). The growth of these indi-
cators has been spurred by generous support by the development assistance commu-
nity, especially multilateral development ﬁnance agencies, and the inﬁnite appetite
of media and the academic community for governance assessments and country rank-
ings. Governance indicators are now being used as tools for conducting development
dialogue, allocating external assistance and inﬂuencing foreign direct investment.
Each new indicator series is now released with great fanfare from major industrial
country capitals and the popular press uses these indicators to name and shame
individual countries for any adverse change in rank order over time or across coun-
tries. The development assistance community is increasingly using these indicators
in making critical judgments on development assistance. The World Bank’s Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA) allocation - a window of subsidized lending
to the developing world and the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment’s Millennium Challenge Account use various governance indicators as criteria
for allocating external assistance. At the same time, some of the recent ﬁndings of
these indicators have also led to much controversy and acrimony and thereby con-
∗The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and should not be attributed to
World Bank and its Executive Directors. Authors are grateful to the participants of Advanced Aca-
demic Update ”Governance Indicators and Assessments - Impact and Future Trends” (Maastricht
Graduate School of Governance, Netherlands, January 21-22, 2009), Bavarian Graduate Program
in Economics Research Workshop (Bayreuth, Germany, January 22-23, 2009) for comments on
earlier versions of this paper.
†Comments are welcome and should be addressed to: ashah@worldbank.org.
1tributing to complicating the dialogue on development eﬀectiveness.1 In view of the
inﬂuential nature of these indicators and potential to do harm if judgments embod-
ied in these indicators are biased and erroneous, it is imperative that they capture
critical dimensions of the quality of governance and all countries are evaluated using
uniform and reasonably objective assessment criteria.
Do the existing indicators meet this test? While the literature on this subject is
woefully inadequate and thin, four widely used indicators - namely the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs), Overseas Development Institute’s World
Governance Assessments (WGAs), Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Indexes of African
Governnace (IIAGs) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s
African Governance Report Indicators (AGRIs) - all lack a conceptual framework
on governance, lack a citizen-based evaluations and have time and country assess-
ment inconsistencies, making their rankings suspect. A number of recent papers
have been especially critical of WGIs for lacking ”concept” (implying lack of clar-
ity in conceptualization) and ”construct” (implying lack of clarity in measurement)
validity, sample bias (mostly interest group views), lack of transparency and time
inconsistency of deﬁnitions and measurements (see Arndt, 2008, Arndt and Oman,
2006, Kurtz and Schrank, 2007, Iqbal and Shah, 2006, 2008, Langbein and Knack,
2008, Schrank and Kurtz, 2008, Thomas, 2006, Thompson and Shah, 2003). One of
the most important limitations common to all available composite indexes of gover-
nance is that they fail to capture how citizens perceive the governance environment
and outcomes in their own countries.
For governance assessments to be useful for policy purposes, they must concep-
tualize governance and provide uniform and consistent criteria for measuring gov-
ernance across countries and over time. Foremost concerns for such measurement
should be citizens’ evaluation of governance environment and outcomes in their own
countries supplemented of course by objective indicators of the same. For develop-
ment assistance purposes, these indicators could be supplemented by expert-based
evaluations. There is some work available on objective indicators as done by the
Doing Business indicators of the World Bank and on expert-based evaluations as
done for the Global Integrity Index. The most important void in our knowledge is
how citizens view governance environment and outcomes in their countries. This
paper takes a ﬁrst step to ﬁll that void.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses conceptual issues
in measuring governance, speciﬁes a citizen-centric conceptual framework on mea-
suring governance quality. Section 3 presents an empirical framework, data sources
and aggregation techniques. Section 4 presents preliminary results. In Section 5 we
discuss the robustness of our results, as well as the contributions and limitations of
the empirical approach. A concluding section outlines an agenda for future research.
1See Iqbal and Shah (2008) for examples of indefensible country ranking and questionable cross-
country and time series comparisons by one of the more widely used indicators
22 Conceptualizing and measuring governance
quality in a comparative context
Governance is a fuzzy yet fashionable buzzword and its use in the literature has
exploded in recent years. Dixit (2008) notes that there were only 4 citations in
EconLit in the period 1970-1979 compared to 15455 in the most recent period of
2000-2007 and currently Google lists more than 152000 pages of this literature.
According to American Heritage, Random House and Merriam Webster dictionaries,
governance is equated with government and is deﬁned as the ”exercise of authority
and control” or ”a method or system of government and management” or ”the act,
process or power of governing”. Huther and Shah (1998) deﬁned governance as ”a
multi-faceted concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of authority through
formal and informal institutions in the management of the resource endowment
of a state. The quality of governance is thus determined by the impact of this
exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens” (p.2). The World
Bank Governance and Anti-corruption (GAC) Strategy (World Bank, 2007) deﬁnes
it as ”the manner in which public oﬃcials and institutions acquire and exercise the
authority to shape public policy and provide goods and services” (p.3).
For our current purpose, none of the above deﬁnitions with the sole exception
by Huther and Shah, is helpful in serving as an operational guide to carry out a
comparative review of quality of governance across countries or even of one country
over time. This is because of their singular focus on the processes/institutions which
do not lend themselves to easy or fair comparability across countries and sometimes
not even within one country without conducting deeper analytical studies. There
can be little disagreement that same processes and institutions can lead to diver-
gent governance outcomes just as dissimilar processes could yield similar outcomes
in two diﬀerent countries. For example, anti-corruption agencies in countries with
fair governance helps curtail corruption but in countries with poor governance prove
either to be ineﬀective or worse a tool for corrupt practices and victimization (Shah,
2007). As another example, budget secrecy prior to its presentation to the parlia-
ment is just as important under parliamentary form of government as in Canada,
UK, India, New Zealand, as open and participatory budget determination process is
to presidential form of government as in the USA. There can be little disagreement
that both types of processes have the potential to advance public interest but may
succeed or fail in diﬀerent country circumstances. During the past two decades, we
have also seen that single party dominant political systems in China, Malaysia and
Singapore have shown dramatic results in improving governance outcomes whereas
pluralistic party systems have also shown positive results in other countries such
as Brazil and India. Similarly monarchy has shown positive results in UK but un-
welcome results in Nepal. Even similar electoral processes do not always lead to
representative democracy and may instead yield aristocracy (elite capture) in some
countries and corrupt oligarchies in others. In fact, Aristotle’s main argument for
elections was based upon the premise that these would produce aristocracy, a form
of government he considered superior to median voter rule (see Azfar, 2008). An-
drews (2008) argues that such ”good governance picture of eﬀective government
... constitutes a threat, promoting isomorphism, institutional dualism and ”ﬂailing
3states” and imposing an inappropriate model of government that ”kicks away the
ladder” today’s eﬀective government climbed to reach their current state.”(p.2) In
any case, such comparisons of processes and institutions out of their context are
almost always ideologically driven and value laden and could not be acceptable as
unbiased professional (scientiﬁc) judgments. This also explains that while citizens
of Bangladesh, China, India and Malaysia over the last decade have experienced
remarkable improvement in governance outcomes, available primary indicators fail
to capture these accomplishments due to their focus on processes at the neglect of
outcomes. Even for the world as a whole, the information revolution by letting the
sun shine on government operations, has brought about dramatic improvements in
government accountability, but the WGIs with their on one-size-ﬁt all vision of the
world, have consistently failed to notice or recognize such a mega change. These
indicators rank China in the lowest percentile on voice and accountability but ac-
cording to the former Auditor General of Canada, China has the most eﬀective public
accounts committee anywhere which has a track record of holding government to
account for malfeasance (Dye, 2007). Furthermore local governments in China have
relatively much larger role in public service provision than most countries. Local
governments below the provincial level account for about 54% of consolidated pub-
lic expenditures in China compared to about 4% in India and about 27% in OECD
countries (see Shah and Shah, 2006). Thus having the decision making closer to
people, directly elected local governments, and party oversight of local government
performance - all work to create a system of voice and accountability that is quite
unique to China and not easily comparable to other countries (see Qiao and Shah,
2006). China has also demonstrated superior government eﬀectiveness through its
unique and unparalleled success in alleviating poverty and improving the quality of
life of its citizens over the past two decades. About two decades ago, China had
about 35% of its population below poverty level compared to less than 2% in 2006
(see Shah and Shen, 2007). In conclusions, comparisons of governance institutions
requires deeper analytical work through in-depth comparative studies rather than
aggregate indicators. Such indicators are more usefully used to compare governance
outcomes and complementary analytical studies of institutions and process can be
used to explain varying outcomes. Of course, governance outcomes also assume
commonly shared values but it is relatively less problematic than one-size ﬁt-all
prescriptions on processes.
To have meaningful governance comparisons across countries and over time, one
needs to have concepts which are somewhat invariant to time and place and are
focused on citizens’ evaluations rather than interest groups’ views. To this end, we
deﬁne governance as an exercise of authority and control to preserve and protect
public interest and enhance the quality of life enjoyed by citizens. Note that this
deﬁnition encompasses both the governance environment (quality of institutions
and processes) as well as governance outcomes.
42.1 Towards a simple framework for assessing country
governance quality
Considering a neo-institutional perspective, various orders of government (agents)
are created to serve, preserve, protect and promote public interest based upon the
values and expectations of the citizens of a state (principals). Underlying assumption
is that there is a widely shared notion of the public interest. In return, governments
are given coercive powers to carry out their mandates. A stylized view of this public
interest can be characterized by four dimensions of governance outcomes.
• Responsive Governance. The fundamental task of governing is to promote and
pursue collective interest while respecting formal (rule of law) and informal
norms. This is done by government creating an enabling environment to do
the right things - that is it promotes and delivers services consistent with
citizen preferences. Further, the government carries out only the tasks that
it is authorized to do that is it follows the compact authorized by citizens at
large.
• Fair (equitable) Governance. For peace, order and good government, the gov-
ernment mediates conﬂicting interests, is focused on consensus building and
inclusiveness and ensures a sense of participation by all and protection of the
poor, minorities and disadvantaged members of the society.
• Responsible Governance. The government does it right i.e. governmental
authority is carried out following due process with integrity (absence of cor-
ruption), with ﬁscal prudence, with concern for providing the best value for
money and with a view to earning trust of the people.
• Accountable Governance. Citizens can hold the government to account for all
its actions. This requires that the government lets sunshine in on its operations
and works to strengthen voice and exit options for principals. It also means
that government truly respects the role of countervailing formal and informal
institutions of accountability in governance.
Given the focus on governance outcomes, Table 1 presents some preliminary
ideas for discussion on how to operationalize these concepts in individual country
assessments.
The above simple framework captures most aspects of governance outcomes es-
pecially those relevant for development policy dialogue and can serve as a useful
starting point for a consensus framework to be developed. In any event, there can
be little disagreement that one cannot embark on measuring governance quality
without ﬁrst deﬁning and defending an appropriate framework that measures gover-
nance - a point also emphasized by Thomas (2006) and the European Commission
(see Nardo et al., 2005). Once a consensus framework is developed then one needs
to focus on only a few key indicators that represent citizens’ evaluations and could
be measurable with some degree of conﬁdence in most countries of the world and
could be defended for their transparency and reasonable degree of comparability
5Table 1: Governance outcomes and relevant considerations
Governance outcome Relevant considerations
Responsive
governance
• public services consistent with citizen preferences;
• direct possibly interactive democracy;
• safety of life, liberty and property;
• peace, order, rule of law;
• freedom of choice and expression;
• improvements in economic and social outcomes;
• improvements in quantity, quality and access of
public services;
• improvements in quality of life;
Fair governance
• fulﬁllment of citizens’ values and expectations in
relation to participation, social justice, and due
process;
• access of the poor, minorities and disadvantaged
groups to basic public services;
• non-discriminatory laws and enforcement;
• egalitarian income distribution;
• equal opportunity for all;
Responsible
governance
• open, transparent and prudent economic, ﬁscal
and ﬁnancial management;
• working better and costing less;
• ensuring integrity of its operations;
• earning trust;
• managing risks;
• competitive service delivery;
• focus on results;
Accountable
governance
• justice-able rights and due process;
• access to justice, information;
• judicial integrity and independence;
• eﬀective legislature and civil society oversight;
• recall of oﬃcials and rollbacks of program possible;
• eﬀective limits to government intervention;
• eﬀective restraints to special interest capture.
Source: Shah (2008)
6and objectivity.2 Having an enormous number of indicators, which could not be
scrutinized, is nothing but a distinct disadvantage for a measure that aims for wider
acceptance and conﬁdence.
Implementation of the above framework requires a worldwide survey with uni-
form questionnaire honing on the four dimensions of governance identiﬁed above
across countries. Given that such a survey is not available and costly to commis-
sion, in the following section, we take a pragmatic approach based upon available
survey data to develop rough indexes of governance quality.
3 Citizen-centric governance: Empirical
framework
Following Table 1, public interest is characterized by four dimensions of governance
outcomes - responsive governance, fair governance, responsible governance, and ac-
countable governance. Each of these categories is split further on sub-categories in
order to characterize a concrete governance outcome (such as improvements in qual-
ity of life, safety, peace, etc.). Public opinion survey, with the questions assigned to
each subcategory, should be used for the assessment of governance.
The procedure of the assessment consists of the two main steps. First, data
source - the raw data from inter-country public opinion survey - is chosen. The
responses on questions in the survey, which characterize governance outcomes, are
recorded. Second, the responses are aggregated in order to achieve governance index
for each country from the sample.
In what follows, we consider both steps in detail.
3.1 Data
Reliable, comprehensive and consistent through time and space source of data is
essential for qualitative estimation of citizen-centric governance indicators (CGIs).
With an additional requirement of being publicly accessible and, preferably, free of
charge, such data source hardly exists at present. There is a database of governance-
related questions included into diﬀerent surveys across the world (Governance Sur-
veys Database published by the World Bank). In principle, each of these questions
could be included into our estimation (questions taken separately from diﬀerent
polls) if the data is available. However, as the experiments in the construction
of surveys suggest (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, for examples), even the
small diﬀerence in the formulation of a question (assigned to the same sub-criterion)
or the sequence of questions in a survey may bring signiﬁcant discrepancies in the
responses for the same country and same sub-criterion. Therefore, we decided to
use only one data source, which covers suﬃcient amount of countries. Eﬀectively it
means, that almost the same questionnaire is used in all participating countries.
2see Andrews and Shah (2005) for details and relevant indicators of an approach that emphasizes
citizen-centric governance and Shah and Shah (2006) for citizen-centered local governance and
relevant indicators
7The principal data source for our further analysis is the World Values Survey
(WVS) project, conducted by WVS Association (see WVS, 2008). Table A2 shows
its characteristics in comparison with other potential data sources. WVS provides
an acceptable compromise of consistency and coverage for showing an initial picture
of citizen-centric governance indicators. On the one hand, WVS publishes quite
outdated information (with the time lag of 2-3 years after actual survey was taken),
and only a few questions from this survey are relevant for our purposes (since the
survey is about cultural values, not governance). On the other hand, WVS provides
quite comprehensive geographical coverage (97 countries with all major economies
included) combined with acceptable time coverage and questionnaire.
The coding (which is used further in text and in the dataset) and questions
assigned to each sub-criterion of governance are presented in the Table A1 of Ap-
pendix. As one can see, for a few sub-criteria, speciﬁed in the Table 1 of the paper,
no survey questions are available. This is a drawback of WVS, as this survey was
not constructed to evaluate governance. However, each governance outcome has a
suﬃcient representation by questions in order to get reasonable estimates.
Based on the data from WVS (questions from the Table A1 of Appendix), as well
as from the other freely available data sources (AFR, ASB, TI GCB - see Table A2
for notation), a unique dataset was constructed, which can be used for the evaluation
of citizen-centric governance indicators by any researcher. 421994 people’s responses
(256152 of them by WVS) on 74 diﬀerent questions (20 from WVS) are recorded
in this dataset. 125 countries are covered, 97 of them by WVS. The records in the
dataset can be sorted by the gender, income, education of a respondent, as well as
by the sub national administrative unit of his/her residency.
For the reasons explained above our main estimation procedure is based on 3
waves of the World Values Surveys depending on the year when the surveys were
taken. Wave 1 includes countries surveyed from 1994 to 1998, wave 2 - from 1999 to
2004, and wave 3 - from 2004 to 2008. In addition to questions from WVS, in the
wave 3 we also use one question about corruption from Transparency International
Global Corruption Barometer (see TI, 2005).
As an alternative to the WVS, we apply additional data sources in our estimation
of citizen-centric governance indicators. In particular, in this paper we report the
results when using Gallup World Poll data points, which are available freely from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (see WBI, 2008).3 4 questions
from GWP are used in WGI. While this coverage is quite limited, yet it allows us
to estimate 3 governance outcomes for a wide range of countries.
3.2 Aggregation
The underlying assumption of our empirical investigation is that the quality of
governance in a given country directly aﬀects governance outcome, which is being
analyzed in a certain survey question. Thus, the answers of survey respondents
- citizens of this country - are better for each question the higher is the quality of
governance in the country. At the same time, answers of the respondents are random
3Gallup World Poll, described in the Table A2, is itself very expensive (28 thousands US Dollars
per year), and therefore cannot be used as a base for a rigorous, replicable research
8variables, which are subject to personal errors:







where i = 1,..,M is the index of a country, j = 1,..,Ni is the index of a respondent
(total number of respondents, obviously, changes from country to country), and
k = 1,..,K is the index of a question in a survey (thus of a particular governance
outcome). sijk is the answer on question k of the respondent j in the country i. Each
response was normalized by us on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 being the worst answer,
and 1 being the best answer. gi is the quality of governance in the country i. It does
not depend neither on concrete respondent, nor on speciﬁc question. Coeﬃcient βk
reﬂects a degree, to which governance aﬀects the answer of a respondent. Note that
it does not depend on country or respondent. Finally, ǫijk ∼ N(0,σ2
ik is the personal
random error of the respondent j in the country i, which may also depend on a
speciﬁc question. Each error is independently normally distributed with zero mean
and the variance σ2
ik, which may depend on country and speciﬁc question.
The expression for gi can be rewritten:
gi = wksijk − wkǫijk, (2)
where wk = 1
βk - are the question-speciﬁc weights assigned to each question. The
weights are normalized to add up to one -
PK
k=1 = 1 - so that gi is between 0 and 1
for each country. For our main estimation, and for further comparative analysis, the
weights are exogenously chosen and are reported in the Table A1 of the Appendix.
They reﬂect the relative importance of every question in assessment of governance
(i.e. ”satisfaction with life in general” is clearly more comprehensive than ”satisfac-
tion with health” or ”satisfaction with environment”), as well as alleviate certain
data deﬁciencies (i.e. European countries were not asked some questions in the sec-
ond wave of WVS, so these questions received lower weight). At the same time, the
weights can be easily changed to tailor one’s speciﬁc research agenda or check the
robustness of the results.
Given our assumptions, the most eﬃcient, unbiased, and consistent estimator for
the governance in country i is just the sample mean of weighted averages of citizens’

























We gave up more sophisticated data mining approaches (e.g. principal component
analysis, canonical analysis or random projections) for the sake of transparency
and simplicity. The choice of weights or aggregate procedure does not signiﬁcantly
change the appearing governance picture (see Section 5). Our procedure is maxi-
mally open and simple in order to allow for a further research and analysis. Besides,
in addition to the governance scores we report and analyze the aggregate responses
on each question, which makes our indicators ”actionable”, and allows drawing the
conclusions, which are completely independent of weights and aggregation proce-
9dure.
4 Citizen-centric governance: Preliminary
rankings
Based on the estimation procedure described above we report our results in this
section. First, we analyze citizen-centric indicators (CGIs) as well as responses on
separate questions in all countries in 3 waves of World Values Surveys and Gallup
World Poll. Then we compare the indexes by groups of countries, through time
(across 3 waves), and with other governance indicators (in particular, Worldwide
Governance Indicators). In the last subsection, we give examples of sub-national
CGIs in several countries.
4.1 Country rankings: Waves 1 to 3
The countries’ citizen-centric governance indicators (CGIs) are presented in Figure
1 and Figure 2. On the ﬁrst ﬁgure we show the estimations based on the data
from World Values Survey, for the second ﬁgure we use the data from Gallup World
Poll (see Section 3.1 for details about data sources). All 3 waves of WVS surveys
are shown in Figure 1: (a) Wave 1 - for surveys taken between 1994 and 1998 (53
countries), (b) Wave 2 - for surveys taken between 1999 and 2004 (71 countries), (c)
Wave 3 - for surveys taken between 2005 and 2008 (51 countries).
The maps of citizen-centric governance evaluations are, in our opinion, more con-
venient tool for analysis than the tables with more than 100 records, though those
are also available from authors at the request. In Figure 1 we split our sample of
countries into 3 broad categories (6 categories in Figure 2): from dark-green high-
governance-quality countries to light-green low-governance-quality countries. While
developed countries (especially Scandinavian countries and Switzerland) show sta-
ble and high grades, it is rather unexpected that East Asian countries (especially,
Vietnam, China) are relatively high rated. In some countries of the Middle East
(Jordan, Saudi Arabia) the popular support of the government is also ”unexpect-
edly” high. At the same time, countries of Central and Eastern Europe are always
in the lowest percentiles of the samples.
In Figure 3 we compare citizen-centric governance indicators with correspond-
ing Worldwide Governance Indicators (WBI, 2008), which are considered to be the
”gold standard” of governance assessment by the media. The scale changes from
dark-green for countries, which were severely underestimated by WGIs, to dark-
red for countries, which were greatly overestimated. 27 out of 82 countries in our
sample were over- or underestimated at a signiﬁcance level less than 25% (9 at a
level less than 5%) by WGIs in comparison to our assessments. The pattern de-
scribed in the paragraph above is supported: Middle East and East Asian countries
are mostly underestimated (with China, Vietnam, Iran and Saudi Arabia being the
leading outliers), while Central and Eastern European countries are too praised by
WGI (Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Hungary being the leading outliers). Appar-
ently, our indicators reﬂect last decade’s obvious successes of East Asian and Middle
10Figure 1: Citizen-centric governance indicators (data source - WVS, waves 1-3)
11Figure 2: Citizen-centric governance indicators (data source - GWP)
Note: u. X-Y% means that the country was underestimated by WGI in comparison to CGI at
the signiﬁcance level between X and Y%; o. X-Y% means that the country was overestimated by
WGI in comparison to CGI at the signiﬁcance level between X and Y%. The time period
considered is 1994-2005, aggregate CGIs are taken, WGIs are averaged over all 6 components
Figure 3: CGI vs. WGI (Worldwide Governance Indicators)
12Note: Averages on each governance outcome (as is deﬁned in the Table A1) in the selected
groups of countries: World - the whole sample, EU-15 - countries from European Union before
the extension of 2004, CEE - Central and Eastern European countries, East Asia - East Asian
countries (China, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand)
Figure 4: WVS wave 3: governance outcomes by groups of countries
East countries in economic outcomes. At the same time, WGIs rely more on the
Anglo-Saxon institutional design of a government, which does not always lead to
desired governance outcomes given local historical and institutional contexts (see
our discussion in the Introduction).
The disaggregated data are analyzed in Figure 4. Here we depict regional av-
erages by each governance outcome (based on the data from the third wave of
WVS). It can be seen that the curve of the EU-15 group - ”old” members of the
European Union - is almost always above other curves in the dimension of Respon-
sive Governance (till the ”happiness” point on the X-axis). When it comes to the
questions about Responsive and Accountable Governance (conﬁdence in parliament,
government, press, TV, courts) the curve steeps down. The curve of the East Asian
countries, while mostly above the world’s average, rises above the curve of EU-15
only in trust-related dimensions. Similar properties (though with somewhat lower
averages) have the curves of Middle East and African countries (the curves are not
depicted in the ﬁgure to keep at least some tractability). The curve of Central and
Eastern European countries (CEE) is always below East Asian curve, as well as
the world’s average. Particularly low (relative to others) citizens of CEE countries
evaluate their conﬁdence in police (”safety” on X-axis) and respect for human rights
in their respective countries (”human rights” on the X-axis).
The fact that people in the East Asia, Middle East and Africa trust their govern-
ments more than the people in developed countries of Western Europe and North
America may not only reﬂect the overall public satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with
governance outcomes. In depressed countries, it may also be the result of people’s
13fear to disclose their true opinion about government. Alternatively, when mass me-
dia in a country are controlled by the government, people in this country may be
indoctrinated to believe and trust those on the top. In the Section 5.2 we analyze
these possible eﬀects and their magnitude for the countries from our sample.
4.2 Intertemporal comparison
The consistent through time questionnaires of the WVS and repeated surveys during
three waves allow us to assess the progress of the governance in certain countries. In
particular, citizens of 41 countries were surveyed both during the ﬁrst wave of WVS
(1994-98) and during the second wave (1999-2004). Surveys both from the second
wave and the third wave (2005-2008) are available for 33 countries.
In Table 2 we report the countries which achieved the biggest progress in each
governance outcome (both from Wave 1 to Wave 2, and from Wave 2 to Wave 3).
Not surprisingly, the list is dominated by developing countries and the countries in
transition - of 110 positions (10 governance outcomes plus CGIs themselves) only
14 are taken by developed countries (Spain and Germany between waves 1 and
2, and Japan between waves 2 and 3). These numbers clearly reﬂect increase in
the standard of living and stable economic growth in certain parts of the world.
Especially it concerns the speedy economic recovery of CEE countries after the
horrible post-communist ”hangover” of the 1990s. The most commonly mentioned
countries are Nigeria, Venezuela, Latvia, Bangladesh, Moldova between waves 1 and
2, and Turkey, Russian Federation, Jordan, India and South Africa between waves
2 and 3.
The governance in the world (over the sample of countries surveyed by WVS)
statistically signiﬁcantly (at the level of less than 1%) increased from wave 1 to
wave 2 (see Figure 5) - in contrast to the WGI’s world of unchanging governance
quality - but practically did not change from wave 2 to wave 3. As it can be seen
from the ﬁgure the main driver of the growth in world’s quality of governance was
increasing (in practically all regions) satisfaction of the citizens with their ﬁnancial
situation. This trend was kept from wave 2 to wave 3 as well, but the overall
progress was apparently mitigated by the fall of conﬁdence in governments, courts,
army, etc. in developing and countries in transition (though CEE countries still
ended up progressing from wave 2 to wave 3).
4.3 Subnational CGIs
Our estimation procedure as well as dataset collected allows us to extend citizen-
centric governance indicators from countries to their subnational units. The idea is
to aggregate the citizens’ responses not over the whole country, but over its juris-
dictions. For the Wave 3 of WVS there are 1121 of them in the sample - usually
the second tier of a country’s administrative structure (in some countries - groups
of second tier jurisdictions).
The examples of some countries are given in Figure 6. On the left we depict
Germany, and on the right - Italy. Both countries were surveyed in 2006. In Germany
14Table 2: CGI (WVS): top performers by the progress in time
Governance outcome Top-performers: Wave
1 to Wave 2
Top-performers: Wave
2 to Wave 3
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Note: Top performers - in each governance outcome (as deﬁned in the Table A1) 5 countries with
the biggest mean diﬀerence between corresponding waves
15Note: Progress in time for some governance outcomes and CGI in 4 regions. First 2 columns for
each outcome compare wave 1 and wave 2 over common sample of countries, columns 3 and 4
compare wave 2 and wave 3 over common sample of countries. Governance outcomes included
are: ”satisfaction with ﬁnancial situation in the household”, ”peace” (conﬁdence in the army),
”conﬁdence in government”, and ”conﬁdence in courts”. The regions: World - all countries in the
samples, EU-15 - European Union members before the extension of 2004, CEE countries -
Central and Eastern European Countries, East Asia - East Asian countries.
Figure 5: CGI (WVS) waves 1-3: progress over time by regions
16Note: left side - Germany, survey of 2006; right side - Italy, survey of 2006. The scale is common
to both countries.
Figure 6: Subnational CGI (WVS): examples
rich industrial lands4 of Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Saarland together with
independent cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin are the most satisﬁed with their
governments. At the same time, the scores are much lower in the poorer eastern
part of the country - only in Sachsen-Anhalt citizen’s gave their government more
than 0.55 (the score of the land is 0.56). Surprising are the average scores received
by the governments of rich southern states - Baden-W¨ urtemberg and Bayern.
The relative correspondence between richness of a jurisdiction and it’s govern-
ment’s score is also kept in Italy. Most regions of the rich country’s North score
more than 0.55. At the same time, most of the poorer South - with the exception
of Abruzzo, Molise, and Basilicata regions - is below 0.55.
Subnational CGIs is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst attempt to assess governance at
less aggregate than the country level. Analyzing these may prove to be helpful in
empirical research on decentralization and governance, decentralization and welfare,
diﬀerence between capital and non-capital regions, industrialized and rural regions,
etc.
5 Robustness
Combination of survey data with the simple aggregation procedure raises quite a few
questions about the validity and reliability of our results. In this section we try to
4L¨ ander in German - second tier jurisdictions in the country
17resolve some of them. First, we provide some arguments in favor of our aggregation
procedure and overall analysis of the data. Second, we make a critical assessment
of the data we have available.
5.1 Alternative aggregation techniques
Transparency, simplicity and possibility to tailor the assessment procedure for one’s
research agenda are the main reasons behind adopting our aggregation procedure
- taking weighted averages of citizens’ responses. Besides, some questions are rel-
atively more important and comprehensive for assessing governance, which cannot
be detected by mechanized data mining algorithms. In addition, many of our ﬁnd-
ings and conclusions concern directly separate governance outcomes (responses on
a separate question), which does not depend on aggregation procedure.
Nevertheless, we use alternative aggregation techniques to test the robustness
of our results. In particular, we apply uniform weights to our data, as well as we
use averaging over percentile rankings (the way it is done in the Doing Business
project - Djankov, 2007). Naturally, both methods produce slightly diﬀerent rank-
ings comparing to our main methodology. In particular, European countries lose
some positions and East Asian countries gain - the result of increased reliance on
the governance outcomes, which are related to trust and conﬁdence in governmental
institutions. However, only 11 of 51 countries in case of uniform weights (10 out
of 51 in case of averaged percentile rankings) signiﬁcantly change their standing
(according to classiﬁcation provided in the Figure 1, wave 3 - when country changes
one of three categories).
5.2 Adjusting the data
In our estimation we use survey data from countries around the world, and the
public opinion in a country - especially about the issues related to the government
- might be inﬂuenced by factors, which we would deﬁnitely like to account for. One
of the factors is so-called ”intimidation” eﬀect, when people are afraid to express
their true - negative - opinion about their government, because they think they
could be punished for that. Another factor, frequently mentioned in the literature,
is the ”indoctrination” eﬀect, when mass media in a country praise the government
so much, that it has a signiﬁcant positive impact on public opinion. Another factor
is the degree of citizen activism and perceived role of government in a country.
In particular, Norris (1999) argues about the emergence in the 70s in developed
countries of the class of so called ”critical citizens” - people, who were becoming
more and more critical and demanding towards their governments despite their
obvious successes.
Taking into account 3 factors mentioned above (”intimidation”, ”indoctrination”,
”critical citizenship”) we conclude that in general a response on a question about
governance outcome of an individual might be aﬀected not only by the quality of
governance in a country. The true model can be rewritten in the following way:
sijk = αik + βkgi + γikintij + ηikindij +  ikcr citik + ǫijk, (4)
18where similarly to the notation from Section , sijk is a response of an individual j
in a country i on a question k, gi is the quality of governance in a country i, , and
ǫijk is a citizen-, country- and question-speciﬁc error. intij, indij, cr citij are the
degrees of intimidation, indoctrination and critical citizenship of an individual j in a
country i. γik, ηik and  ik - depending on country and question - are the coeﬃcients
of our interest.
The estimation of γik, ηik and  ik is not possible from the model above, since we
do not observe governance gi (this is in fact what we are trying to assess). However,
the problem can be resolved if we note, that for some questions (governance out-
comes) there are no eﬀects of intimidation, indoctrination or critical citizenship, and
for some there are. For instance, when an individual is asked about the satisfaction
with her/his health, it is likely that she/he will not be intimidated to say true. At
the same time, questions like ”Do you have conﬁdence in your government?” are
most probably subject to all above mentioned eﬀects. Therefore, by taking the dif-
ference between the answers on these questions we can get rid of the governance on
the right-hand side while intimidation, indoctrination and critical citizenship eﬀects
















where sijk, k = 1,..,K1 are the citizens’ answers on the questions, which are exposed
to the biasing eﬀects (intimidation, indoctrination, critical citizenship), sijk, k =
K1 + 1,..,K2 are the answers on the questions with no role for above mentioned
eﬀects. Therefore, the left-hand side of our model is the diﬀerence between the
averages of the two groups of questions (governance outcomes). Assuming that these
groups of governance outcomes explain governance to the same degree (average βk’s
are the same) we get rid of the quality of governance in the right-hand side, and
can test for γik, ηik and  ik directly. After taking into account these eﬀects the
















(γiintij +  iindij + ηicr citij) (6)
gi is now the weighted average of people’s responses (the formula we adopted in the
main body of the paper) less the eﬀects of intimidation, indoctrination and critical
citizenship - averaged over all residents of a country surveyed and multiplied by the
weight of the questions in the survey, which are exposed to these eﬀects.
We assume the following questions (governance outcomes) to be independent
from the bias eﬀects:
• How satisﬁed are you with the ﬁnancial situation of your household? (im-
provements in economic and social outcomes)
• All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these
days? (improvements in quality of life: general)
• All in all, how would you describe your state of health today? (health)
19• How serious do you consider poor water quality, air quality, sewage and sani-
tation to be here in your own community? (environment)
• Taking all things together would you say you are [happy, unhappy]? (happi-
ness)
On the opposite, the following questions (governance outcomes) are assumed to be
exposed to bias eﬀects:
• How much conﬁdence do you have in government? (trust: executive branch)
• How much conﬁdence do you have in parliament? (trust: legislative branch)
• How much conﬁdence do you have in press? (trust: press)
• How much conﬁdence do you have in television? (trust: television)
• How much conﬁdence do you have in courts? (trust: courts)
5.2.1 Testing for the intimidation, indoctrination and ”critical
citizenship” eﬀects
We use 2 types of estimation procedures to extract γi, ηi and  i - eﬀects of intim-
idation, indoctrination and ”critical citizenship” in a country i. First, we test for
indoctrination (ηi) on an individual level, since there can hardly be any proxy for
biasedness of mass-media (indoctrination) on a country-level. On a contrary, it is
hard to come up with the proxies for personal intimidation and ”critical citizenship”
(this eﬀect was in fact deﬁned only for countries as a whole). That is why we use
country-level regressions to identify these eﬀects.
As the proxy for indoctrination we take the frequency, with which an individual
exposes her- or himself to media - TV and press. Speciﬁcally, we use questions ”Did
you watch TV during the last week?” and ”Did you read newspapers last week?”
from the World Values Survey. The more people watch TV or read newspaper the
more they are exposed to possible indoctrination (or excessive criticism of mass-
media). The exact estimation model then becomes:
diffij = α
′
i + η1itvij + η2ipressij + θidemogrij + ǫ
′
ij, (7)
where tvij, pressij are the dummies for watching TV and reading newspapers last
week (as it was posed in the questions of the survey), demogrij is a set of individual
demographic variables (we take respondent’s education, income, age, marital status,
political activism - participation in demonstrations, boycotts, signing petitions).
We report the results in the Table 3. The main conclusion from it is that even
though developing countries, especially those in Middle East and East Asia, seem to
be indoctrinated, the mass media bias is also present in many developed countries
- Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, France. This might be the outcome not of
state monopoly (or dictate) on mass media, but of too optimistic or patriotic news
coverage in these countries. The magnitude of the indoctrination eﬀect ranges from
0.02 (except for Ukraine and Rwanda, where those who watch TV are actually more





0.08 - 0.12 Japan, Mexico, India, Slovenia, Cyprus,
Ethiopia
Thailand, Cyprus
0.04 - 0.08 Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Turkey, Peru,
Moldova, Indonesia, Vietnam, Serbia, Egypt,
Andorra, Burkina Faso, Zambia, France
Jordan, Malaysia




Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Finland,
Germany, Ghana, Italy, Republic of Korea, Mali, Morocco, Nether-
lands, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Trinidad
and Tobago, United Kingdom
-0.08 - -0.02 Ukraine, Rwanda Indonesia
Note: First column - ranges for point OLS estimates are reported. For each range, only the
countries, for which coeﬃcients are diﬀerent from 0 at a signiﬁcance level less than 5%, are
reported. ”≈ 0” range - countries with no signiﬁcant TV or press bias. Sample of the countries
used - WVS wave 3 (except Iran, Iraq, Hong Kong, New Zealand, where questions about mass
media were not asked)
critical towards the government) to 0.12, which combined with on average 75% of
respondents watching TV or reading newspaper, may lead for some countries to a
decrease in our estimates of governance by 0.005-0.03 points.5
Intimidation and ”critical citizenship” eﬀects are estimated on a country level.
Speciﬁcally, as a proxy for the intimidation level in a country we use the average
score of the country in the ”Freedom in the World” ranking - an annual publication
of the Freedom House, where political and civil rights of the citizens are assessed.
As for the ”critical citizenship” eﬀect, we follow Pippa Norris (Norris, 1999) in her
deﬁnition of a ”critical citizen”, and deﬁne the country to be in the stage of ”critical
citizenship” if it had been classiﬁed ”free” by the Freedom House for at least ten
years before the survey was conducted (long period of stable democracy), and the
GDP per capita in this country (taken from IMF) was more than 10000 US dollars
(wealthy population). Most OECD countries together with Slovenia and Chile enter
the group. The estimation model than becomes:
diffi = α + γfreedomi +  cr citi + θdemogri + ǫi, (8)
5Note that our estimates of governance are assessed on a scale from 0 to 1.





P>t 95% conf. int.
freedom −0.03∗∗∗ 0.007 0.000 -0.05 -0.02








Note: *** - signiﬁcant at less than 1% level. Method of estimation - OLS. Sample - countries
surveyed by World Values Survey during all 3 waves.
where freedomi is an index of Freedom House, cr citi is the ”critical citizenship”
dummy deﬁned above, and demogri is a set of demographical country-speciﬁc vari-
ables (average level of education, share of married population, share of males, average
age).
The estimation results are presented in the Table 4. As one can see from the
table, both freedom of the county and its being in the stage of ”critical citizenship”
are highly statistically signiﬁcant in explaining biases on responses on trust-related
questions in the WVS surveys. The directions of the eﬀects are what would be intu-
itively foreseen. In the Freedom House ranking a country has the higher score the less
civil and political rights it’s citizens have: 1 is the best score, 7 is the worst. There-
fore, negative γ in our estimation means that the intimidation eﬀect plays a greater
role in less free countries. 1 score up in the Freedom House ranking of a country
makes the citizens of this country to be more cautious in answering government-
related questions in a survey, and consequently overestimate their governments in
trust-related questions by 0.03 points. For a completely depressed country (with the
score 7) the eﬀect on our governance estimate would be -0.07 points. From the other
side, residents of the countries, which are in a stage of ”critical citizenship”, do have
signiﬁcantly less conﬁdence in their governments then they should have had. If not
too ”critical”, residents of these countries would give their governments score 0.09
points higher, which would be reﬂected in the increase of citizen-centric indicator
on about 0.03.
Even though we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of indoctrination, intimida-
tion and ”critical citizenship” in some countries, the magnitude of these eﬀects is
not particularly immense. For example, Vietnam with our score of 0.72 is not a free
country based on criteria of Freedom House (it had rank 6 in 2005), and there is a
moderate (0.05) eﬀect of indoctrination on television. Together these eﬀects would
cut citizen-centric governance indicator in Vietnam by 0.07 points. New indicator
would be 0.65 - still in the highest 20th percentile of the sample. Apparently, there
are other reasons for some governments to score so high in the public opinion polls.
In case of East Asia the main of them is probably last decade’s stable economic
22growth and development in the region (as it is argued for China by Wang, 2005).
At the same time, poor economic performance, political conﬂicts and corruption in
the 90s (and for many countries up until today) in Central and Eastern European
countries keep the scores the governments in this regions extremely low.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has provided a conceptual framework for measuring governance quality
using citizens’ evaluations consistently across countries and over time. It further
provided empirical illustration - using data from the World Values Survey Asso-
ciation - of the usefulness of the methodology by developing governance quality
rankings for 120 countries. These rankings signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those provided
by available indicators that mostly capture foreigners’ (mostly interest groups) or
arm-chair experts’ opinions.
The surveys of the WVS project are certainly subject to important limitations.
They are not conducted in the same year for all countries, and the questionnaires may
slightly diﬀer from country to country, which may produce signiﬁcant departures
from objective estimation. It is also possible that in spite of the claims to the
contrary by the survey organization, the survey may not be based on stratiﬁed
random sampling for some countries due to practical diﬃculties (for instance, WVS
for Vietnam).
Notwithstanding these limitations, the dataset constructed by us has important
merits. The governance-related questions and answers are reported on the level of
individual respondents in our dataset, which gives researchers a great ﬂexibility in
composing the rankings. In particular, it is possible to compose rankings among
the people with higher education, diﬀerent genders, income, etc. Most importantly
and contrary to many other indicators, the data used in our estimation are freely
accessible, and can be easily used by other researchers to replicate or modify our
estimation procedure.
Ideally, our theoretical framework should be implemented using a world poll
with stratiﬁed random sampling employing a uniform questionnaire across countries
and over time. The World Gallup Poll or a similar instrument might oﬀer such an
opportunity in the near future.
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criteria 1 2 3 comp.
A Responsive
governance





How satisﬁed are you with the
way the people in national of-
ﬁce are handling the country’s
aﬀairs?
0.25 0.15 0 0
21 safety of life, or-
der, rule of law
How much conﬁdence do you
have in police?




How satisﬁed are you with the
way the democracy is develop-
ing in your country?
0.15 0.15 0 0
32 How democratically is your
country being governed today?




How satisﬁed are you with
the ﬁnancial situation of your
household?




All things considered, how sat-
isﬁed are you with your life as
a whole these days?




All in all, how would you de-
scribe your state of health to-
day?




How serious you consider poor
water quality to be here in your
own community?
0 0 0.03 0
72 How serious you consider poor
air quality to be here in your
own community?
0 0 0.03 0
73 How serious you consider poor
sewage and sanitation to be
here in your own community?
0 0 0.03 0
81 peace How much conﬁdence do you
have in armed forces?
0.05 0.05 0.03 0.1
91 inmprovements
in quality of life:
happiness
Taking all things together
would you say you are [happy,
unhappy]?
0 0 0.25 0
B Fair gover-
nance






criteria 1 2 3 comp.
11 social justice, re-
spect for human
rights
How much respect is there for
individual human rights nowa-
days in the country?




How proud are you to be your
nationality?
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
C Responsible
governance
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
11 earning trust:
executive branch
How much conﬁdence do you
have in government?




How much conﬁdence do you
have in parliament?
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5
21 corruption Would you say that this coun-
try is run by a few big interests
looking out for themselves, or
that it is run for the beneﬁt of
all people?
0.3 0.3 0 0
22 In your view, does corruption
aﬀect your personal and family
life, business environment, po-
litical life not at all, to a small
extent, to a moderate extent,
or to a large extent?






How satisﬁed are you with the
way the people in national of-
ﬁce are handling the country’s
aﬀairs?
0.3 0.3 0 0
D Accountable
governance
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15





How much conﬁdence do you
have in press?






criteria 1 2 3 comp.





How much conﬁdence do you
have in television?




How much conﬁdence do you
have in courts?
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Note: The data source for all (but C24) questions is World Values Survey (WVS,
2008). Question C24 was taken from Transparency International Global Corruption
Barometer (TI, 2005). The coding corresponds to the coding used in our dataset.
Weights used: 1 - for wave 1 (1994-98) of WVS, 2 - for wave 2 (1999-2004), 3 - or
wave 3 (2004-08), comp. - for comparison between these 3 waves. Weights of
sub-categories are given within the category (A, B, C, or D)






Num. Region Free Lag, y.
World Values Survey WVS 97 worldwide 1994-
2008
3-6 yes 2-3 average




3 yes 1-2 high
Asiabarometer ASB 25 East Asia 2003-
2006













TI GCB 62 worldwide 2004-
2008
1 yes <1 very low




1 no 1 high
Eurobarometer EUB 30 Europe 1973-
2008
0.5 yes <1 very high
Gallup World Poll GWP 130 worldwide 2007-
2008
1 no n.a. n.a.





119 worldwide 2007 1 yes 0 low
Note: Number - the total number of countries, which participated in all waves of survey; Freq. - average time period in years, in which a country is
surveyed; Lag - the time period in years between taking a survey and posting data; Relevancy - correspondence of questions in a questionnaire to the
subcriteria of governance from the Table 1, given on the scale: very low-low-average-high-very high.
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9Table A3: Citizen-centric governance indicators: aggre-
gate and disaggregate data by country, waves 1-3
country year N
A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
WAVE 1
Albania 1998 999 38 65 .. .. 40 42 75 .. 56 .. .. 81 46 54 21 .. 38 33 39 65 83 45 0.6
Azerbaijan 1997 2002 42 46 52 .. 40 49 66 .. 53 .. 58 86 77 64 22 .. 42 36 40 46 100 48 0.6
Argentina 1995 1079 35 32 .. .. 44 66 68 .. 32 .. .. 81 33 26 12 .. 35 41 36 32 83 42 0.8
Australia 1995 2048 43 63 .. .. 60 73 77 .. 59 .. .. 90 36 40 32 .. 43 32 38 63 83 55 0.7
Bangladesh 1996 1525 74 42 .. .. 56 60 62 .. 56 .. .. 92 70 72 60 .. 74 61 59 42 83 62 0.7
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
1998 1200 48 68 .. .. 40 50 66 .. 77 .. .. 80 63 53 43 .. 48 50 54 68 83 53 0.8
Brazil 1997 1149 49 40 .. .. 50 68 73 .. 63 .. .. 82 43 31 25 .. 49 53 49 40 83 52 1.1
Bulgaria 1997 1072 36 49 .. .. 29 41 64 .. 72 .. .. 77 54 45 27 .. 36 46 60 49 83 43 0.8
Belarus 1996 2092 22 40 29 .. 25 37 51 .. 65 .. 34 68 50 35 17 .. 22 44 47 40 100 34 0.5
Chile 1996 1000 51 49 .. .. 55 66 67 .. 53 .. .. 81 50 40 32 .. 51 48 51 49 83 54 0.8
China 1995 1500 .. .. .. .. 57 65 74 .. .. .. .. 76 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32 63 2.7
Colombia 1997 6025 31 48 .. .. 78 81 75 .. 57 .. .. 94 39 30 21 .. 31 46 49 48 83 54 0.8
Croatia 1996 1196 44 56 .. .. 40 58 63 .. 67 .. .. 75 51 46 34 .. 44 36 36 56 83 49 0.8
Czech rep. 1998 1147 35 45 .. .. 46 60 63 .. 44 .. .. 73 37 30 18 .. 35 45 48 45 83 45 0.7
Dominican
rep.
1996 417 17 28 .. .. 53 68 73 .. 41 .. .. 89 27 27 8 .. 17 43 46 28 83 40 0.8
Estonia 1996 1021 30 47 43 .. 33 44 57 .. 46 .. 43 63 48 44 15 .. 30 51 58 47 100 41 0.5
Finland 1996 987 42 69 .. .. 63 75 74 .. 68 .. .. 78 40 40 28 .. 42 40 50 69 83 57 0.6
Georgia 1996 2008 30 37 31 .. 23 41 62 .. 48 .. 32 86 45 39 6 .. 30 52 53 37 100 36 0.6
Germany 1997 2026 38 54 52 .. 58 66 66 .. 45 .. 53 53 32 35 29 .. 38 31 35 54 100 49 0.5
Hungary 1998 650 40 52 .. .. 44 54 60 .. 54 .. .. 80 44 42 18 .. 40 37 44 52 83 46 0.7




A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Japan 1995 1054 28 63 .. .. 59 62 65 .. 56 .. .. 62 40 37 23 .. 28 59 58 63 83 50 0.5
Korea, rep. 1996 1249 42 49 .. .. 52 .. 73 .. 61 .. .. .. 47 39 17 .. 42 57 55 49 66 47 0.8
Latvia 1996 1200 30 37 32 .. 29 43 56 .. 36 .. 36 59 40 33 4 .. 30 48 52 37 100 36 0.5
Lithuania 1997 1009 29 34 38 .. 34 44 59 .. 45 .. 35 60 44 39 10 .. 29 58 60 34 100 38 0.5
Macedonia 1998 995 28 36 .. .. 41 52 71 .. 46 .. .. 86 28 25 26 .. 28 33 36 36 83 39 0.9
Mexico 1996 2364 33 35 .. .. 69 73 65 .. 54 .. .. 87 42 44 29 .. 33 49 48 35 83 51 0.8
Moldova 1996 984 27 37 26 .. 23 30 51 .. 53 .. 30 70 43 41 17 .. 27 41 47 37 100 32 0.6
New
Zealand
1998 1201 31 68 .. .. 61 74 78 .. 56 .. .. 87 30 30 22 .. 31 41 44 68 83 52 0.7
Nigeria 1995 1996 29 32 .. .. 52 62 76 .. 46 .. .. 81 33 32 11 .. 29 56 58 32 83 44 1.1
Norway 1996 1127 64 67 .. .. 64 74 78 .. 60 .. .. 80 57 58 72 .. 64 42 49 67 83 65 0.5
Pakistan 1997 733 .. 33 .. .. 41 .. 69 .. 92 .. .. 94 .. .. .. .. .. 54 59 33 38 51 1.3
Peru 1996 1211 49 34 .. .. 46 60 64 .. 50 .. .. 92 46 28 57 .. 49 42 45 34 83 49 1.0
Philippines 1996 1200 47 54 .. .. 56 65 66 .. 62 .. .. 89 55 56 41 .. 47 65 64 54 83 57 0.9
Poland 1997 1153 40 51 .. .. 37 60 56 .. 67 .. .. 89 43 40 20 .. 40 48 49 51 83 47 0.8
Puerto Rico 1995 1164 48 55 .. .. 66 79 72 .. 59 .. .. 95 52 37 39 .. 48 52 45 55 83 59 0.9
Romania 1998 1239 27 43 .. .. 32 43 64 .. 72 .. .. 76 32 31 20 .. 27 41 49 43 83 38 0.8
Russian fed-
eration
1995 2040 17 36 .. .. 26 38 50 .. 63 .. .. 65 32 31 7 .. 17 43 47 36 83 31 0.7
Serbia and
Montenegro
1996 1520 36 46 .. .. 34 52 63 .. 58 .. .. 71 41 39 31 .. 36 35 36 46 83 43 0.9
Slovakia 1998 1095 41 43 .. .. 40 56 62 .. 58 .. .. 77 44 37 34 .. 41 46 49 43 83 46 0.7
Slovenia 1995 1007 40 49 .. .. 48 61 59 .. 47 .. .. 84 45 35 22 .. 40 46 52 49 83 48 0.7
South
Africa




A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Spain 1995 1211 29 54 .. .. 52 62 70 .. 44 .. .. 85 37 40 33 .. 29 46 44 54 83 47 0.7
Sweden 1996 1009 45 65 .. .. 58 75 78 .. 52 .. .. 78 45 47 41 .. 45 39 50 65 83 57 0.6
Switzerland 1996 1212 54 58 .. .. 70 78 79 .. 47 .. .. 67 49 45 39 .. 54 35 40 58 83 59 0.6
Taiwan 1994 780 44 54 .. .. 57 62 64 .. 62 .. .. 60 58 48 48 .. 44 46 50 54 83 54 0.6
Turkey 1996 1907 34 61 .. .. 47 58 68 .. 86 .. .. 90 43 45 20 .. 34 49 48 61 83 49 0.9
Ukraine 1996 2811 21 39 25 .. 22 33 50 .. 60 .. 27 60 43 39 12 .. 21 44 47 39 100 31 0.5
UK 1998 1093 .. .. .. .. .. 73 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 73 4.7
USA 1995 1542 45 61 .. .. 62 74 78 .. 72 .. .. 92 41 40 27 .. 45 39 39 61 83 56 0.7
Uruguay 1996 1000 35 49 .. .. 64 68 74 .. 37 .. .. 89 41 41 23 .. 35 53 51 49 83 51 0.9
Venezuela 1996 1200 19 34 .. .. 44 64 76 .. 59 .. .. 97 31 28 16 .. 19 57 53 34 83 42 1.1
WAVE 2
Albania 2002 1000 26 58 34 .. 42 46 74 .. 51 .. 41 89 54 45 35 .. 26 40 52 58 100 44 0.7
Algeria 2002 1282 32 60 41 .. 55 52 62 .. 63 .. 38 89 49 34 13 .. 32 47 45 60 100 47 0.9
Argentina 1999 1280 33 32 44 .. 50 70 71 .. 35 .. 34 85 28 23 10 .. 33 44 40 32 100 45 0.7
Austria 1999 1522 .. 64 60 .. .. 78 .. .. 45 .. 63 81 .. 46 .. .. .. 41 .. 64 60 66 0.9
Bangladesh 2002 1500 62 51 62 .. 51 53 66 .. 68 .. 61 90 76 78 44 .. 62 75 69 51 100 59 0.6
Belgium 1999 1912 .. 50 44 .. .. 71 .. .. 41 .. 56 64 .. 41 .. .. .. 41 .. 50 60 56 1.1
Bosnia and
herzegovina
2001 1200 35 57 39 .. 43 53 71 .. 58 .. 39 66 39 34 19 .. 35 38 42 57 100 45 0.7
Bulgaria 1999 1000 .. 47 37 .. .. 50 .. .. 54 .. 40 67 .. 36 .. .. .. 37 .. 47 60 45 1.5
Belarus 2000 1000 .. 43 37 .. .. 42 .. .. 61 .. 41 63 .. 40 .. .. .. 44 .. 43 60 43 1.3
Canada 2000 1931 53 68 57 .. 65 76 80 .. 59 .. 68 87 44 43 47 .. 53 42 44 68 100 63 0.6
Chile 2000 1200 55 53 53 .. 52 68 71 .. 48 .. 54 87 53 39 35 .. 55 47 51 53 100 56 0.7
China 2001 1000 59 60 65 .. 52 61 70 .. 80 .. 73 68 79 76 83 .. 59 59 62 60 100 64 0.6




A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Czech rep. 1999 1908 .. 43 42 .. .. 67 .. .. 39 .. 56 69 .. 28 .. .. .. 44 .. 43 60 53 1.0
Denmark 1999 1023 .. 72 59 .. .. 80 .. .. 55 .. 78 80 .. 49 .. .. .. 41 .. 72 60 70 0.8
Egypt 2000 3000 77 78 77 .. 47 48 70 .. 59 .. 63 94 55 62 31 .. 77 62 61 78 100 62 1.1
El Salvador 1999 1254 .. 51 .. .. 59 72 71 .. 49 .. .. 93 43 35 26 .. .. 48 52 51 70 58 1.3
Estonia 1999 1005 .. 41 42 .. .. 55 .. .. 42 .. 52 60 .. 37 .. .. .. 45 .. 41 60 48 1.1
Finland 2000 1038 .. 73 53 .. .. 76 .. .. 69 .. 75 83 .. 46 .. .. .. 43 .. 73 60 68 0.7
France 1999 1615 .. 57 48 .. .. 67 .. .. 55 .. 54 75 .. 40 .. .. .. 38 .. 57 60 57 1.1
Germany 1999 2036 .. 59 59 .. .. 71 .. .. 49 .. 62 63 .. 41 .. .. .. 42 .. 59 60 61 0.9
Greece 1999 1142 .. 36 51 .. .. 63 .. .. 59 .. 58 80 .. 33 .. .. .. 37 .. 36 60 53 1.1
Hungary 1999 1000 .. 44 40 .. .. 53 .. .. 45 .. 52 79 .. 38 .. .. .. 36 .. 44 60 48 1.3
Iceland 1999 968 .. 68 55 .. .. 78 .. .. 42 .. 72 88 .. 61 .. .. .. 44 .. 68 60 68 0.7
India 2001 2002 52 42 56 .. 44 46 68 .. 84 .. 65 87 53 52 34 .. 52 64 65 42 100 52 0.7
Indonesia 2001 1004 36 52 40 .. 61 66 70 .. 63 .. 59 80 52 46 30 .. 36 53 56 52 100 54 0.6
Iran 2000 2532 59 56 55 .. 53 60 75 .. .. .. 61 95 62 63 51 .. 59 44 50 56 97 58 0.8
Iraq 2004 2325 .. .. .. .. 49 47 74 .. 55 .. 39 90 40 .. 30 .. .. .. 54 .. 60 48 1.6
Ireland 1999 1012 .. 73 56 .. .. 80 .. .. 58 .. 67 91 .. 41 .. .. .. 44 .. 73 60 69 0.9
Israel 2001 1199 .. .. .. .. .. 67 .. .. .. .. .. 78 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23 68 4.9
Italy 1999 2000 .. 59 42 .. .. 69 .. .. 51 .. 56 75 .. 41 .. .. .. 42 .. 59 60 58 1.0
Japan 2000 1362 28 49 45 .. 57 61 65 .. 57 .. 54 59 37 34 16 .. 28 59 58 49 100 49 0.5
Jordan 2001 1223 63 83 59 .. 44 51 76 .. 85 .. 62 89 78 62 31 .. 63 59 57 83 100 60 0.7
Korea, rep. 2001 1200 39 49 42 .. 53 58 73 .. 57 .. 47 64 40 24 12 .. 39 56 56 49 100 48 0.6
Kyrgyzstan 2003 1043 38 29 39 .. 52 61 67 .. 53 .. 38 74 38 38 17 .. 38 46 51 29 100 45 0.8
Latvia 1999 1013 .. 42 40 .. .. 47 .. .. 47 .. 50 73 .. 35 .. .. .. 46 .. 42 60 46 1.3
Lithuania 1999 1018 .. 37 35 .. .. 47 .. .. 48 .. 31 55 .. 27 .. .. .. 60 .. 37 60 41 1.4




A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Macedonia 2001 1055 26 48 27 .. 38 46 72 .. 51 .. 36 78 20 17 7 .. 26 33 35 48 100 37 0.9
Malta 1999 1002 .. 59 64 .. .. 80 .. .. 62 .. 62 91 .. 49 .. .. .. 40 .. 59 60 67 0.8
Mexico 2000 1535 44 34 42 .. 63 79 70 .. 53 .. 48 91 39 28 27 .. 44 45 47 34 100 53 0.8
Moldova 2002 1008 31 38 27 .. 34 40 50 .. 54 .. 31 60 39 38 9 .. 31 46 49 38 100 36 0.6
Morocco 2001 2264 46 51 44 .. 49 56 77 .. 66 .. 42 95 54 25 23 .. 46 41 36 51 100 49 0.9
Netherlands 1999 1003 .. 57 59 .. .. 76 .. .. 44 .. 70 65 .. 51 .. .. .. 53 .. 57 60 65 0.6
New
Zealand
2004 954 .. 63 .. .. 63 77 72 .. 62 79 69 89 45 42 .. .. .. 37 43 48 73 63 0.7
Nigeria 2000 2022 59 39 57 .. 59 65 87 .. 49 .. 56 87 49 47 28 .. 59 62 68 39 100 57 0.8
Pakistan 2001 2000 43 35 27 .. 28 43 69 .. 79 .. 53 93 42 68 11 .. 43 55 55 35 100 43 0.5
Peru 2001 1501 45 33 45 .. 46 60 64 .. 37 .. 46 90 35 28 43 .. 45 39 40 33 100 47 0.7
Philippines 2001 1200 49 58 47 .. 53 63 67 .. 65 .. 71 94 51 57 39 .. 49 63 65 58 100 58 0.8
Poland 1999 1095 .. 55 44 .. .. 58 .. .. 62 .. 51 89 .. 40 .. .. .. 50 .. 55 60 54 1.5
Portugal 1999 1000 .. 58 62 .. .. 67 .. .. 61 .. 57 91 .. 47 .. .. .. 57 .. 58 60 62 1.0
Puerto Rico 2001 720 47 57 54 .. 72 83 75 .. 55 .. 53 98 49 39 48 .. 47 48 39 57 100 62 0.7
Romania 1999 1146 .. 47 32 .. .. 47 .. .. 72 .. 36 77 .. 28 .. .. .. 45 .. 47 60 44 1.6
Russian
Federation
1999 2500 .. 34 19 .. .. 41 .. .. 61 .. 25 65 .. 27 .. .. .. 36 .. 34 60 35 1.4
Saudi Ara-
bia
2003 1502 .. .. .. .. 69 70 84 .. .. .. 62 89 .. .. 41 .. .. 60 63 .. 58 67 1.5
Serbia and
Montenegro
2001 2260 38 43 41 .. 33 51 65 .. 58 .. 48 65 36 33 29 .. 38 36 39 43 100 43 0.7
Singapore 2002 1512 71 .. .. .. 63 69 .. .. .. .. .. 82 .. .. 77 .. 71 .. .. .. 53 69 1.2
Slovakia 1999 1331 .. 45 33 .. .. 56 .. .. 62 .. 53 65 .. 42 .. .. .. 47 .. 45 60 50 1.2




A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
South
Africa
2001 3000 44 56 48 .. 45 59 81 .. 51 .. 51 86 51 49 32 .. 44 53 61 56 100 53 0.9
Spain 1999.52409 46 53 56 .. 58 67 72 .. 44 .. 58 81 46 48 40 .. 46 45 43 53 100 56 0.6
Sweden 1999 1015 44 62 52 .. .. 74 .. .. 47 .. 63 76 .. 50 .. .. 44 48 .. 62 74 60 0.7
Tanzania 2001 1171 53 63 63 .. 28 32 70 .. 86 .. 67 91 78 74 52 .. 53 70 72 63 100 54 1.1
Turkey 2001 4607 34 62 25 .. 37 51 68 .. 80 .. 28 82 43 39 17 .. 34 34 37 62 100 43 0.9
Uganda 2001 1002 55 56 58 .. 43 52 73 .. 71 .. 60 85 72 69 50 .. 55 63 62 56 100 57 0.8
UK 1999 1000 .. 60 50 .. .. 71 .. .. 69 .. 59 79 .. 42 .. .. .. 26 .. 60 60 60 1.0
Ukraine 1999 1195 .. 36 27 .. .. 40 .. .. 61 .. 31 57 .. 33 .. .. .. 46 .. 36 60 38 1.5
USA 1999 1200 55 62 56 .. 61 74 81 .. 71 .. 62 89 44 44 37 .. 55 38 38 62 100 60 0.6
Venezuela 2000 1200 54 41 57 .. 58 72 .. .. 59 .. 49 97 53 36 63 .. 54 59 58 41 97 58 0.9
Vietnam 2001 1000 80 82 86 .. 55 61 66 .. 88 .. 86 92 91 91 91 .. 80 72 78 82 100 75 0.5
Zimbabwe 2001 1002 36 61 37 .. 24 33 72 .. 58 .. 36 88 52 50 18 .. 36 55 57 61 100 41 0.9
WAVE 3
Andorra 2005 1003 .. 53 .. 49 59 68 72 44 .. 73 60 75 41 .. .. .. .. 43 41 41 88 58 1.4
Argentina 2006 1002 .. 31 .. 67 61 75 70 16 38 73 44 87 41 25 .. 20 .. 41 39 30 100 52 1.1
Australia 2005 1421 .. 69 .. 68 59 70 66 45 69 76 64 88 44 42 .. .. .. 30 35 51 94 60 0.8
Brazil 2006 1500 .. 43 .. 58 54 74 67 37 62 75 47 72 45 29 .. .. .. 43 41 47 94 57 0.8
Bulgaria 2006 1001 .. 51 .. 37 34 47 52 22 64 53 35 73 38 29 .. 14 .. 48 58 40 100 41 0.7
Burkina
Faso
2007 1534 .. 51 .. 52 41 51 65 10 61 67 54 94 48 41 .. .. .. 52 55 47 94 51 0.7
Chile 2005 1000 .. 54 .. 66 52 68 57 39 55 69 49 84 46 32 .. .. .. 45 47 35 94 55 1.8
China 2007 2015 .. 67 .. 64 55 64 59 56 75 65 71 65 77 77 .. 22 .. 62 63 68 100 62 0.6
Colombia 2005 3025 .. 48 .. 59 .. 81 64 .. 58 78 45 96 49 31 .. 25 .. 44 47 39 82 58 0.7




A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Egypt 2008 3051 .. .. .. .. 43 53 58 3 .. 64 .. 91 .. .. .. .. .. 56 67 .. 61 51 1.7
Ethiopia 2007 1500 .. 40 .. 36 43 44 60 14 47 63 38 88 36 35 .. 28 .. 35 36 37 100 42 0.6
Finland 2005 1014 .. 75 .. 71 67 76 62 69 71 74 81 83 56 52 .. 47 .. 42 50 67 100 67 0.6
France 2006 1001 .. 59 .. 62 57 66 66 .. 57 75 .. 72 34 39 .. 21 .. 40 38 40 86 55 0.8
Germany 2006 2064 .. 61 .. 61 56 68 64 69 49 67 61 62 33 33 .. 29 .. 39 41 53 100 56 1.8
Ghana 2007 1534 .. 53 .. 83 46 57 71 29 69 75 72 97 65 60 .. 29 .. 56 65 60 100 60 0.7
Hong Kong 2005 1252 .. 65 .. .. 57 60 55 .. 52 63 64 54 53 50 .. 29 .. 55 59 .. 81 57 0.5
India 2006 2001 .. 60 .. 61 48 53 61 27 76 67 73 89 54 60 .. 27 .. 69 67 65 100 57 0.7
Indonesia 2006 2015 .. 50 .. 61 58 66 64 27 64 73 63 79 54 43 .. 22 .. 52 57 51 100 57 0.5
Iran 2007 2667 .. 57 .. 47 56 60 60 14 59 65 43 84 53 49 .. .. .. 44 51 51 94 53 0.6
Iraq 2006 2701 .. .. .. .. 41 38 57 .. 60 47 35 93 56 .. .. .. .. .. 65 .. 65 46 1.3
Italy 2005 1012 .. 63 .. 53 61 65 63 55 59 69 52 77 36 39 .. 17 .. 37 32 50 100 54 0.4
Japan 2005 1096 .. 57 .. 65 57 67 53 49 61 73 51 60 38 34 .. .. .. 60 59 66 94 59 0.4
Jordan 2007 1200 .. 85 .. 75 60 68 76 19 88 72 65 90 81 61 .. .. .. 64 65 83 94 67 2.4
Korea, rep. 2005 1200 .. 53 .. 60 51 60 64 49 51 66 58 69 46 35 .. 12 .. 56 57 48 100 53 3.2
Malaysia 2006 1201 .. 64 .. 67 61 65 72 37 71 77 64 88 67 60 .. 31 .. 58 62 68 100 63 0.4
Mali 2007 1534 .. 64 .. 67 53 57 62 16 76 73 72 96 65 55 .. .. .. 56 62 61 94 61 0.8
Mexico 2005 1560 .. 36 .. 62 68 80 61 35 59 83 53 92 45 31 .. 21 .. 48 47 40 100 59 0.7
Moldova 2006 1046 .. 32 .. 45 42 49 51 21 41 49 33 60 37 34 .. 29 .. 43 49 35 100 41 0.6
Morocco 2007 1200 .. 58 .. 44 44 47 70 13 63 68 56 83 54 47 .. .. .. 51 55 60 94 52 0.5
Netherlands 2006 1050 .. 53 .. 62 65 75 65 .. 45 78 .. 69 36 38 .. 49 .. 39 42 46 86 60 1.6
Peru 2008 1500 .. 29 .. 51 52 67 50 15 35 65 33 .. 26 22 .. 12 .. 33 34 21 98 43 0.7
Poland 2005 1000 .. 48 .. 52 46 67 54 29 60 71 55 86 31 27 .. 14 .. 45 46 40 100 50 0.7




A B C D
prec CGI var
11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21
Russian
Federation
2006 2033 .. 37 .. 37 41 57 44 .. 60 58 .. 75 44 34 .. 26 .. 40 45 40 86 46 1.1
Rwanda 2007 1507 .. 76 .. .. 38 44 40 32 .. 65 .. 92 .. 69 .. .. .. 62 55 70 74 54 0.7
Serbia 2006 1220 .. 39 .. 46 42 56 54 18 49 56 33 78 34 30 .. .. .. 33 33 35 94 43 0.6
Slovenia 2005 1037 .. 43 .. 54 59 69 55 59 42 66 49 82 36 31 .. .. .. 39 43 39 94 55 0.5
South
Africa
2007 2988 .. 57 .. 71 52 67 70 26 58 72 63 91 64 60 .. 27 .. 56 65 60 100 60 4.2
Spain 2007 1200 .. 55 .. 71 54 70 65 .. 50 68 56 84 46 49 .. 48 .. 45 41 52 94 59 0.5
Sweden 2006 1003 .. 63 .. 73 67 75 70 83 48 80 67 76 45 52 .. .. .. 41 51 62 94 68 1.0
Switzerland 2007 1241 .. 66 .. 74 76 78 72 59 49 79 74 74 57 51 .. 43 .. 42 41 63 100 67 1.5
Taiwan 2006 1227 .. 43 .. 66 56 62 68 57 44 68 58 54 38 25 .. 7 .. 30 28 42 100 51 1.3
Thailand 2007 1534 .. 46 .. 67 62 69 65 50 52 77 68 95 45 43 .. 26 .. 49 51 64 100 61 0.5
Trinidad
and Tobago
2006 1002 .. 38 .. 57 57 70 68 56 46 79 39 96 37 31 .. .. .. 35 38 41 94 57 1.4
Turkey 2007 1346 .. 66 .. 55 55 72 59 18 82 73 41 93 59 56 .. 23 .. 36 38 68 100 56 0.9
UK 2006 1041 .. 62 .. 61 64 73 67 .. 67 81 .. 81 39 41 .. 33 .. 28 39 55 86 61 1.3
Ukraine 2006 1000 .. 38 .. 35 40 52 46 19 52 61 37 67 35 30 .. 23 .. 46 49 37 100 43 1.2
USA 2006 1249 .. 61 .. 59 54 70 69 37 71 76 59 85 44 36 .. 25 .. 37 38 53 100 56 2.3
Vietnam 2006 1495 .. 85 .. 77 59 68 54 41 93 72 79 93 93 92 .. .. .. 81 87 84 94 73 0.4
Zambia 2007 1500 .. 49 .. 63 49 56 64 37 55 59 51 83 47 44 .. .. .. 51 55 52 94 54 0.8
Note: The table presents citizen-centric governance indicators for all countries and waves of surveys as well as mean responses by
each question used in estimation. The data source for all (but C24) questions is World Values Survey (WVS, 2008). Question C24
was taken from Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (TI, 2005). year - year of the survey. N - number of
respondents. Columns 4 to 23 - mean responses to each question used in our estimation, the coding corresponds to the coding
used in our dataset. prec - weights-adjusted amount of questions actually asked in a country during a survey (some questions were
not asked in some countries), weights for each question are given in the Table A1. CGI - citizen-centric governance indicators,
point estimates. var - estimates of variance of CGIs. All numbers are given in percentages (including variance).
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